Central Bank independence and economic performance in Caucasus and Central Asian Countries

Authors

  • Islam Rizvanoghlu University of Houston
  • Abdulkadir Nagac Independent Researcher

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15549/jeecar.v5i2.234

Keywords:

Central Bank Independence, CCA countries, economic performance, LVAW index

Abstract

This paper explores the association of both central bank independence (CBI) and financial market development with the economic performance of Turkey together with six former centrally planned former Soviet Union countries located in Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA countries). First, we construct a legal independence index (LVAW) for central banks. Then, we analyze the relationship between central bank independence and macroeconomic variables. Our findings suggest that there is a positive correlation between central bank independence and GDP growth, whereas the sign of correlation between CBI and GDP deflator is negative. Besides, the economies with higher level of financial deepening are also associated with high CBI.

Author Biographies

Islam Rizvanoghlu, University of Houston

I am an Instructional Assistant Professor of Economics at the Unievrsity of Houston. I completed my Phd in Economicst at Rice University in 2012.

Abdulkadir Nagac, Independent Researcher

Graduated from University of Texas, Austin in 2009 with a PhD degree in Economics. Published in well-known journals.

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Published

2018-11-28

How to Cite

Rizvanoghlu, I., & Nagac, A. (2018). Central Bank independence and economic performance in Caucasus and Central Asian Countries. Journal of Eastern European and Central Asian Research (JEECAR), 5(2), 14. https://doi.org/10.15549/jeecar.v5i2.234