The Implementation of Anti-trust Legislation in an Economy Undergoing Transformation, Using the Example of the Polish Tabloid Market

Hanna Trojanowska


The problem of predatory pricing and legislation on it is a long-established feature of western market economies, but for Poland and other post-communist countries, it is a relatively new phenomenon. One aspect of the transformation to a market economy in Poland was the introduction of anti-trust legislation, the implementation of which has often posed a dilemma for the courts: to strictly enforce laws forbidding predatory pricing, or to err on the side of leniency, in order to encourage competition. This article examines these issues in the context of the court case involving two Polish tabloid newspapers, 'Super Express' and 'Fakt', and the long-term impact of the court's verdict.


predatory pricing, market theory, game theory, Chicago School, Polish press market


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